T he table of contents of J. C. Dorsainvil's Manuel d' histoire d'Haïti,¹ which for a long time has been the bible for Haitian schoolchildren, has a little surprise in store for those who consult it. After chapter eighteen, none of the chapters has a title, which leads us to understand that the same title applies for all the rest. Th us, the thirteen chapters that follow must have the same title as the eighteenth: "Defending Haiti" ("Pour défendre Haïti"). Th ese chapters cover the period from 1804 to today. Does this mean that since Haiti proclaimed its independence, it has always been on the defensive?
Th is makes you wonder: Did the generals who in 1804 led a victorious war know how to defend Haiti? From the early days, these generals did, of course, construct fortifi cations, of which the Laferriere Citadel is the most impressive. But these forts have never been in service. One could even say that they have not been able to prevent the comings and goings of foreign troops, the chronology of which gives pause for thought: Th e fortifi cations erected in 1804 have not, therefore, stopped the return of foreign troops to Haiti. Th e famous slogan, inscribed in Article 28 of the 1805 constitution-"At the fi rst warning strike of the cannon, the country disappears and the nation stands up!" (Au premier coup de canon d'alarme, le pays disparaît et la nation est debout!)-has never been invoked. It has not even been pronounced by any one of our generals or presidents, in spite of these continued comings and goings of foreign troops.
According to the well-known adage, war is the armed wing of politics. But the backbone of politics is mythology. Th e Haitian situation demonstrates to us the ineffi cacy of certain myths, or at least the need to rework them.
STRATEGY AND MYTHOLOGY
In the introduction to his translation of Mao Tse-tung's Collected Poetry, Guy Brossolet analyzes the complex relationships that poetic discourse weaves between myth and politics in Chinese culture. He wonders if a people has any history other than that which simultaneously partakes of myth and reality? If the poem places or displaces problems into an unreal context, if it "modifi es" history, this does not compromise its educational role. Quite the contrary; in eff ect, every civilization has its mythical references, and it is often out of these that the master chooses the "facts" that he presents as an example to his followers.² Brossolet says "the poem," but he could have quite simply said political discourse, even if all political leaders do not become poets, like Mao Tse-tung did, and even though we might wonder if the partisan who listens to his leader does not receive the leader's views as pure poetry. In Haiti, even recently, we have had poet-presidents as leaders. Moreover, the parallel that Brossolet draws between the political "master" and the master in the pedagogical sense is completely applicable to Haiti. Isn't the master essentially he who gives lessons and who illustrates them by his actions? Th is is true of Haiti, and particularly in recent times.
Politics, which is not necessarily inspired by poetic discourses, can even operate without any kind of discourse at all. But even when politics is only action, without an accompanying discourse, it is nonetheless linked to mythology. Th e absence of discourse might even have the advantage of helping politicians avoid contradicting themselves too openly by theorizing their behavior. Th is is what Frédéric Koller brings to light with regard to the political treatment of certain popular traditions in post-Mao China.³ Th e authorities show an openness to myth that has nothing to do with their ideological orthodoxy.
Outside or inside a discourse, poetic or not, politics thus maintains good relations with the kind of mythology that does more than simply tell an epic story. Short statements that have become proverbs and that have passed into the common political or social discourse refer sometimes to real and sometimes to made-up pieces of history that are not explicitly put into the form of a story but could easily be. For these common discourses are sites that feed the collective imagination. Th ey condense another history that takes place in the shadow of the offi cial history, which they complete by explaining or making up for it.
I will try to analyze some of these founding myths of the Haitian nation that can be found in short statements, in order to see if the defense strategy adopted by Haitian leaders since 1804 has fulfi lled its function, and if not, whether it might be worthwhile to rework or modernize these myths by adapting them to the realities of a strategy for today.
It is through reading a book by a supposed CIA agent on the role of oil in the policies of the current American government that I have changed my defi nition of defense. To my great surprise, the author of the book dedicated his entire fi rst chapter to detailing the strategic points of the Aramco installations that a terrorist could attack. It seemed to me initially that, for a defender, he was doing the work of an attacker, at least on the intelligence level. I fi nally understood that the word "defense" signifi ed not only resistance. Of course, to defend is to resist an attack, but even before that it is to prepare oneself to face that attack. Th us, he who must defend himself must practically put himself in the position and adopt the mindset of his opponent to imagine what the opponent might do. Th erefore, defense is in the fi rst place the anticipation of an attack. Th is is perhaps what is meant when people say that attack is the best form of defense. Defenders must fi rst make themselves assailants in their minds in order to foresee the coming of the attack.
We see this strategy of defending by anticipating the attack in our discourse on war. Our words and ideas defi ne a strategy that has two sides: discourse and combat. Th is is especially true when our words are presented as statements of a defense strategy and even lay claim to a collective experience in the matter, as is the case with the slogan of the Haitian Republic: "Togetherness is strength" (L'union fait la force).
If words make statements about strategies, they also illustrate ideologies, utopias, and even myths to the extent that they refer to stories of which they give a concise summary and that every informed listener can recreate in his memory. Two of these statements, "l'union fait la force" and "pluck the chicken, but make sure it does not cry out" (plimen poul la pinga li kriye), were made at the beginning of Haitian history and by the fathers of the nation. And if the third, "luck that passes" (la chance qui passe), has been formulated more recently, it is nonetheless present beneath the surface of older discourses.
L'UNION FAIT LA FORCE (TOGETHERNESS IS STRENGTH)
Th e motto of the Haitian Republic refers to an instructive piece of history. Th e history of the slaves who rose up on 22 August 1791 and undertook a heroic struggle for their freedom is, fi rst, that of a solitary combat. For at their sides and sometimes fi ghting against them, the mainly mulatto free coloreds (aff ranchis) were waging their own struggle for greater liberty. When, in 1803, the blacks and the mulattos, the former slaves and the free coloreds, united their eff orts, they formed an invincible coalition that defeated Napoléon's troops.
However, at the time of their arrival in Saint Domingue in 1802, it was the French troops that made up a formidable coalition. In addition to Poles and Germans, the French had on their side the free colored leaders who had been defeated by Toussaint Louverture and who had consequently been forced into exile in France. Following a switch of sides, whereby the mulatto leaders aligned themselves with the former slaves, the war of independence was won in Haiti. And this is what is referred to in the motto "l'union fait la force."
Strength cannot be acquired and victory cannot be obtained except by a union, by a coalition of forces. By deciding to unite, two sectors of the Saint Domingue population managed to throw the invaders back to the seas. It was a coalition of internal forces, since both free coloreds and former slaves were native to Saint Domingue. In the fi nal stages of the war of independence, through the "positive neutrality" of the British Navy and then after 1804 through the links between King Henri Christophe and English abolitionists like Clarkson and through commercial ties with the United States, this Haitian coalition was reinforced by an external dimension.
To these two dimensions, internal and external, which are spatial to some degree, must be added a third: the temporal, or historic. In eff ect, this alliance between internal natives and external military and commercial forces was like a formation of battle troops in the space of present time: the beginning of the nineteenth century. But there was another dimension that Saint Domingue's liberators had in mind when they gave back to the country its Taino name of Haiti. In giving back the pre-1492 name in 1804, they clearly showed their intention to erase in one stroke the period between 1492 and 1804. Th ey demonstrated their desire to end the chapter of the conquest of the New World, of European colonization, and of exploitation of Amerindians and, later, Africans. Th e year 1804 was to put an end to the genocides, slavery, racism, and colonialism that had prevailed to that point. History was therefore retracing its steps and was taking the route that it had had to abandon in the wake of the European invasion. Th e renaming of Haiti was a gesture heavily tinged with utopianism.
From that point on, the new Haitians' victorious coalition included descendants of Africans (blacks and mulattos), Europeans (Polish and German), and Amerindians who survived the Spanish and who came together with the other Haitians. Article 44 of the 1816 constitution automatically granted Haitian nationality to every African or Indian as soon as they set foot on Haitian soil. Th is was an eloquent means of demonstrating that the 1804 revolution intended to form a coalition of all those, Haitian or foreigners, who opposed the European colonization of the New World.
Th e mitigated successes of the Zapatista guerillas in Chiapas, Mexico, to take but one of the chains of the imagined alliance, allow us to understand the extent to which the ideal of the Haitian Revolution remains, even today, a utopia. Th ey also give a measure of the revolution's mythical dimension. In eff ect, as a narrative of endeavors that surpass those of Hercules in terms of what they accomplished and especially in the changes they eff ected, the history of the Haitian people belongs to mythology; and that is no doubt why one can say neither that it is fi nished nor that it, like the Greek hero, has ended in failure. Th is history will only terminate with the myth that supports it.
What the Haitian Revolution has shown is that to arrive at a union that strengthens (fait la force) as a principle of a winning strategy and that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, sees the revolution as a justifi cation for the ethnic solidarity of blacks and mulattos, various forms of external alliance must be added to this internal solidarity.
l Th e positive neutrality of the British Navy during the fi nal phases of the Haitian war of independence and the defection of Polish and German troops, who were quick to take the side of the Haitian insurgents, show that a union that strengthens is not just one that is made up of people of the same color.
Th ere is implicitly a myth of racial diff erence in this motto, as if a racial solidarity is called for and that its role is to counter another "race." Th is myth of the diff erence of races must therefore give way to a vision of the deracialized union of people of good intentions.
For if the racial diff erences between whites and blacks were able to incite a union between blacks and mulattos, then this same black/mulatto diff erence has pitted so-called men of color against each other-in Saint Domingue after 1804 and throughout the nineteenth century, when the "more capable" struggled for power with the "more numerous."
In his work Tradition orale et imaginaire créole, Raymond Relouzat relates a legend told, he says, by René Depestre:
Just before the beginning of the fi fteenth century, before colonization and the slave trade, there was a gathering of sorcerers who held a particular grudge against humankind. Th ey drew up a particularly formidable curse: to relate color of skin to social rank in societies of the future. By means of hereditary transmission of pigmentation, a tragedy would be imposed on whole lineages of peoples. But this was also a way of condemning humanity as a whole to divide itself up, generation after generation, according to appearances fatally inscribed in the body.⁴ We must believe that these sorcerers held a singular grudge against black-skinned people, as it was they who were to suff er the most from the sorcerers' decision. Relouzat draws a parallel between this legend and other stories, often of a dubious humor, that tell of how the three groups of people-the whites, the mulattos, and the blacks-appeared before God at the beginning of the world and were assigned the roles that they currently play. Th ese legends, says Relouzat, set up a history based on genealogy, and as such reveal a fatalistic if not alienated vision of the destiny of Creole societies.
Th e motto "l'union fait la force" certainly proposes a kind of strategy. But if we do not ask the questions "Union of whom? And for what kind of 'force' or 'strength'?", this strategy will articulate only an increasingly passive defense, one that is limited to an illusory set of allies. For the struggles between Nationals (Nationaux) and Liberals (Libéraux) in the nineteenth century, and the "noiriste" dictatorship of the Duvaliers, have shown that racial solidarity can retreat into increasingly sectarian positions.
We must fi nally deethnicize the national motto, stop enclosing it in a vision of racial solidarity that might turn out to be an illusion. We must broaden its applications and perspectives so that it overfl ows racial boundaries. Does togetherness make strength, does "l'union fait la force"? Yes, but not necessarily between blacks or between only blacks and mulattos, but between all people with the right will. We must therefore envisage every union according to this double reality, which demands that defense involves not only enclosing oneself but also foresight, anticipation of new attitudes, and the adoption of innovative positions and ideas. We must not only think of the attacks that are already in progress but also anticipate the enemy by foiling his traps in order to adapt ourselves to a cultural and historical context that is constantly changing. We must even prepare ourselves for unforeseen attacks. Neocolonialism has not thrown Haitians back to the plantations but trapped them in debts that subjugate them still to the domination of their creditors under the domination of new commanders, the bourgeois money men.
For these reasons we must revisit certain founding myths, like "l'union qui fait la force," and know how to reformulate them according to new needs, our new challenges. We must not only anticipate attacks but also guess where the new battlefronts might open up, and think of our own off ensives. When France recognized Haiti's independence in 1825, a new front opened up-that of debt-that we were unable to recognize and that has shown itself to be an economic trap more formidable than the military front.
And a union-this is why I use the word "coalition" as a synonym-implies that there is a leader. As contemporary history shows us, it does little good to be united with others as a servant or auxiliary. We can only unite to defend a common cause, not someone else's cause. If we do not do this, the force, the strength, will not be ours.
PLIMEN POUL LA PINGA LI KRIYE (PLUCK THE CHICKEN, BUT MAKE SURE IT DOES NOT CRY OUT)
Because independence was achieved by armed struggle, in the aftermath of 1 January 1804, all Haitian life took on a military aspect. It has been pointed out the extent to which this militarization extended into work practices and even infl uenced the rites and pantheon of Vodun. Th e conception that the generals in charge of the country had of economics could only be that of an army. On the day of victory, the army thought only of the booty to plunder. Because pillage was an acquired right, it came to be a foundation for the economic policy of the new Haitian state. Here is how Th omas Madiou describes the behavior of the fi rst Haitian public administrators:
In the administrations in general, they shamelessly put into practice pillage, robbery, treachery, and smuggling. Everyone looked to make their fortune, by any means at all.
Under Toussaint Louverture, the state's coff ers were those of the governor; under Dessalines they had become those of the emperor! . . . Toussaint had retained the sole right to embezzle for himself; the less selfi sh Dessalines said to the administrators: "Pluck the chicken, but make sure it does not cry out" (Plumez la poule, mais prenez garde qu'elle ne crie). Which meant: make your fortune to the detriment of the State but watch out if the public accuses you. Th e use of this kind of language is not surprising when we think of colonial mores, the infl uence of which was still felt strongly at the time. Under the old regime, the most dedicated slave had no qualms about stealing anything from the master to whom he gave freely of his sweat.
While the high ranking offi cials and military offi cials were quickly improving their position, the people, especially those in rural areas, were being held in an iron grip. Forced labor was rife, and the slightest robbery was often punished by death, according to the whims of the military chiefs. Th e condemned man was often whipped or beaten to death by soldiers chosen at random; there was no executioner, and the soldier carried out that role by accident, as if he were fulfi lling a military service.
Th e bayonet system reigned everywhere. Th e military chiefs had in reality the right of life or death over those they controlled; and the commanders acted as justices of the peace. Financial administrators dared not refuse them anything; most of them took considerable sums from the public purse without even giving a receipt; they tolerated smuggling when they could take a personal profi t from it.⁵ As they say in military language: the army lived off the local inhabitant, even if they were compatriots. And the vision held by this army was that of a booty to divide up in a conquered country to be pillaged, or "plucked."
According to reports, the former Zairean leader Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko was a fervent admirer of François Duvalier's methods, and followed them closely. It is not surprising to learn that he made a declaration similar in every way to Dessalines's: "If you want to steal, steal a little and intelligently, in a nice way. If you steal so much that you become rich in one night, you will be caught."⁶ Th e Spanish conquistadors of 1492, the French colonizers of the eighteenth century, and the Haitian liberators of 1804-the diff erence in their behavior lies in kind and not so much in the fi nal aims and objectives. Can we believe that despite everything there has been any change? We see that Madiou allows Dessalines attenuating circumstances. At least he did not want to hear his victim cry out. It is worthwhile to pause for an etymological analysis of the words of the Creole line "plimen poul la pinga li kriye" (pluck the chicken, but make sure it does not cry out). Th is analysis will allow us to understand better the evolving historical variation in the meaning of the analogy drawn between Haiti and a chicken that is being plucked.
First, let us make the highly probable hypothesis that the word "plimen" is derived from the French "plumer," to pluck. French has the related verbs "plumer" and "déplumer." Th e two verbs also exist in Haitian; Haitian Creole dictionaries cite "plimen" and "deplimen." Th ere is, however, a diff erence between the two French verbs. "Plumer" refers to what one does with a dead bird. Th e Robert dictionary defi nes "plumer" thus: "to strip (a bird) of its t feathers by pulling them out. Especially when it has been killed, in order to cook it." On the other hand, "déplumer" does not imply the death of the bird. According to the Robert dictionary, "déplumer" means "to strip of feathers (a living bird)." Creole dictionaries do not specify whether, for either one of the two verbs "plimen" or "deplimen," we should understand that the bird is dead. Besides, in the Haitian language as in French, there is the fi gurative sense of "plumer" which is "to strip, steal (generally through cheating)." And this is the same sense that is found in Dessalines's phrase. Th ere is, fi nally, another fi gurative sense of "plimen" in Haitian (but not French), which is "to make love." We can therefore link etymologically the meaning of the Creole word "plimen" to that of the French verb "plumer" as much to the literal meanings as the fi gurative, with the only reservation that there is some uncertainty in the Haitian word as to the action of plucking and the death of the object of the action. Th is leads us to think that "plimen" is an inoff ensive word in Dessalines's mind, for if the action of plucking was done skillfully enough, the bird (still alive) would not even cry out.
Th at therefore clears up, from the point of view of logic, the uncertainty surrounding the meaning in Creole of "plimen," at least to Dessalines. But etymology is not the only producer of meanings in words. Words also have rhetorical and historical meanings. A comparison constructs meaning according to the relationships between words but also according to the context of these relationships. If the action of "plimen," when applied to the public fi nances of a country, had a meaning in 1804, we can bet that there will be a change in the meaning of this comparison when made in 2004.
In eff ect, in 1804, in the mind of Dessalines and all those who were ransacking Haiti, the chicken that they were plucking was not necessarily dying from their actions. In 2004, on the other hand, when we see the deforestation that has stripped the Haitian land bare, like a plucked chicken, we must say that a "plucked" country, whether it cries out or not, is one that if it is not already dead, soon will be. Th e "plucked" country brings about its own death. To make a country lose its political, fi nancial, and economic independence is to eff ectively reduce it to the condition of the living dead. In Haitian, we would say it was a zombi.
Th is etymological detour shows us that if the word persists, the thing that it designates changes with time. We could not therefore continue to repeat a word and think that what we are doing is constant or unchanging. In Haiti, "plimen poul la pinga li kriye" has become a proverb. And if not everyone has the opportunity to do the "plucking," everyone dreams about it.
To "pluck," pillage, and ransack a country is to politically and economically assassinate it; it is to subjugate it to its money lenders, to the countries that donate money to it, to the loan organizations; it is to make the country a land under control, occupied and dependent on the neocolonial centers. Metaphors can therefore be more eloquent than we might think. If Dessalines could think in 1804 that to pluck was not to kill, today his successors can only reiterate the words of the father of the nation by lying to themselves. For they now know that in authorizing themselves to pluck the country, they are assuring the nation's death, and doing so more eff ectively than any foreign invaders could ever do. Th is is, moreover, how they open the doors wide for the comings and goings of foreign troops against whom, in all truth, nobody is going to build any more Laferriere citadels.
Dessalines had never heard of things like sustainable development, environmental degradation, renewable resources, infant mortality, life expectancy, or per capita income. But today we cannot pretend not to understand their relationship with the famous piece of advice "plimen poul la pinga li kriye."
In a reversal of history, the conquistadors of 1492 whose conquest was supposed to be mitigated by giving back to the country its Amerindian name of Haiti, and the slave-holding colonizers who were thought to be expelled forever by the proclamation of independence, have reappeared and even been reborn at the heart of Haiti's leadership. Th ese leaders, like "bizangos" taking on a new skin, have donned the clothes cast off by yesterday's colonizers and armed themselves with their weapons, and in changing their souls into those of their precursors, carry on the war that they said they wanted to end.
It is true that this change of costumes and actors on the Haitian historical stage would not have been possible without the help of costume designers, makeup people, stage hands, and curtain pullers, hiding out in the wings of the Haitian theater, in whom we can well recognize older actors who had not ever really left the stage.
But that is another history of Haiti. More often than not, this history is left untold, and yet it is the double of offi cial history, the phantom that haunts it.
LA CHANCE QUI PASSE (LUCK THAT PASSES)
It might seem paradoxical for me to talk of luck after having evoked the legend of a gathering of sorcerers who, by making the color of skin the key to social rank, seemed to cast an evil spell on humankind and in particular on those with black skin. Th is is a fairly pessimistic and fatalistic myth. But to believe at the same time in curses and luck shows that opposing myths can turn out to be complementary.
Our destiny is gloomy, but chance will save us. Th us, hope can be discerned in fatalism.
Th e Haitian people's passion for the "borlette," the lottery that even François Duvalier could not suppress, is so great that it haunts everybody day and night. In eff ect, every Haitian after having a dream involving numbers, must immediately run to the lottery to bet on those numbers. In Haiti, the night brings advice and guidance.
Th e anthropologist Gerson Alexis studied the concept of luck as interpreted through various stages of a Haitian's life, from birth to the entry into adulthood. If, Alexis says, the word "hasard" ("chance" or "hazard" in English) is rarely used, it is because Haitians prefer the word "chance" ("luck" in English). Th ere even exist lucky techniques. Th ese techniques are fairly straightforward when they amount to saying prayers but are more complex when "they order the intervention of supernatural powers, the fulfi llment of cabalistic rites commonly called 'ouanga' or 'points.' In this case, the situation might sooner or later bring about harmful consequences for the benefi ciary, and it is best to be wary of these techniques."⁷ Th is remark on the luck-giving "ouanga," or "points," indicates that in Haiti, the concept of luck is linked to Vodun. In fact, the two words are borrowed from Vodun and refer to the techniques of attracting luck. Moreover, the fact that these techniques are not recommended shows us that to want to seize one's luck by barely commendable means is like letting oneself be tempted to sell one's soul to the devil. To want to be lucky is to accept taking an "engagement," to break a taboo-no doubt that initial curse made at the famous gathering of sorcerers. Th is would explain why the popular voice in Haiti regularly accuses those who are rich of having become wealthy by dubious means, most often by sorcery.
A formula starts to take shape. Th e victim of the sorcerers' curse can escape that curse through luck. But to do so is to willingly accept to sell one's soul to the devil, that is, to the same sorcerers who have cast this spell on us. Th e circle closes, as it were, on he who wants to try his luck, which is the only way to escape from misfortune.
Th e optimism that is allowed by the concept of luck is inscribed into a general pessimism. At the very least, no defi nitive way out is foreseen from the current hardship. Th e only solutions that prevail are those that are dependent on the unfortunate situation that one fi nds oneself in. It was with the slogan "la chance qui passe" that the anti-Duvalierists led their campaign in the 1991 presidential election. In so doing, they suggested that the time had fi nally come to move out of this state of constant bad luck; in other words, to "pass" a situation that was attributable to a curse rather than the negligence of the former leaders of the country. In a sense, too, they were also encouraging the voters to bet on themselves. Th ey let it be understood, therefore, that with them, these voters were going to bet on the winning number in the lottery. It was, clearly, an argument well suited to convincing the average Haitian voter/lottery player.
But what is most striking in this slogan is the fl eeting, even transient nature of the kind of luck proposed. Of course, people have always understood that luck is fl eeting. In the case of the lottery, for example, luck is naturally fl eeting, since the drawing of the winning numbers is a singular, if repeated event. Which could not, however, be the case for politics. A party that aspires to govern, according to a certain logic, proposes to do so according to a program, one that defi nes a plan and foresees a set of concrete, practical measures that have nothing to do with the Vodun gods or any other supernatural force. In contrast to the lottery player, the politician cannot rely on luck and can only rely far less on fl eeting, transient luck. Th is is no doubt why in developed countries, people speak of the provident state. Th ere, the citizen is at least assured that his luck will be eternal, like divine Providence.
Even if appropriate techniques could capture it at the moment of its passing, what characterizes luck above all is its supernatural source. Th is is perhaps why luck is always ultimately random and ephemeral. It comes from the goodwill if not the capriciousness of the gods and not from human know-how.
In his book La théorie de la classe de loisir, Th orstein Veblen shows convincingly that r r the fundamental condition for the effi cient operation of modern industrial societies is a rational and technical (rather than religious) foundation. Only reason and technique can avoid the uncertainties of luck, not by off ering solid guarantees of their success but by allowing people to achieve success in a way that is predictable. Positive experiences are conclusive; hopes are less so.
We can understand, therefore, why Gerson Alexis, who throughout his study examines the concept of luck from the point of view of individuals' subjective perception based on their individual behavior, could arrive at a conclusion that could be applied to the collectivity:
When the great Jean-Jacques Dessalines at dawn on 18 November 1803 ordered the charge on the Butte de Charrier and the Fort Vertières, he was attacking a powerful enemy, feared by the world. What is more this was an enemy cornered, ready to use its full military might against those proud, barefooted blacks, who dared to want independence by facing up to France and Bonaparte's soldiers. Dessalines, Gabart, Capois, and the others believed less at that point in the assistance of the unknown, than in their desire to win, to defy the world and history with their courage and their fervent wish to sacrifi ce unreservedly. Th ey won. It was Promethean.⁸ Th is fi nal evocation, which includes in an unexpected way a political, even military, conclusion to an anthropological analysis of Haitian individual and collective psychology, takes us back to the problem of the relationship between strategy and mythology. It turns our focus onto ways of behaving and thinking, and shows that we could not pass without caution from mythology to strategy. In other words, to jump-start the Haitian Revolution, to motivate the slaves, it was necessary to pass by the ceremony at the Bois Caiman; but to bring about the victory of this revolution and, a fortiori, to defend and impose it, we had to rely on diff erent kinds of weapons.
After Th is Haitian recourse to identifi cation with the great ancestors allows us to observe a strange phenomenon. In the passage of historical time, we can see that Boukman succeeded Makandal, Toussaint Louverture succeeded Boukman, and Dessalines succeeded Toussaint Louverture. Every time, another step was taken toward independence through a mutation in the revolutionary struggle that changed at once its strategies and objectives. But since 1804, it seems that there has been a crisis in the handing over of power due to the inability of Dessalines's successors to adapt themselves to the new battles to be fought. Is this why Haitian heads of state, in their identifi cation with the great ancestors, seem to want to bring about a paradoxical return to historical and symbolic time? François Duvalier wanted to associate his image to that of Dessalines. And the latest elected president of Haiti identifi ed himself with Toussaint Louverture. Are we walking backward in time?
Th is ritual of identifi cation looks very much like an inverted process of taking possession. It is as if instead of being possessed by his Vodun god, the Vodun believer wants, by means of oratory incantations, to return to the possession of his god, to mount the god in the way that those who try to capture luck do with the "complex" techniques that Gerson Alexis discusses.
What we can say about Haitian exceptionalism, which, as we have seen, can coexist with a belief in luck, is that there is nothing exceptional about it. After all, who does not claim to be exceptional? Some proclaim, without batting an eye, that they have a "manifest destiny"; others cry "Rule Britannia!" Which, according to them, is their mission. And yet others affi rm that they have the right to "cultural exceptionalism." Th e only diff erence between Haitian and other exceptionalisms is that others have persuaded themselves that their exceptionalism was not a piece of fortune but a mission that they think themselves perfectly capable of accomplishing. And that is why they consequently make all the means to do so. It is no doubt a form of the Prometheanism, the force against which, according to Gerson Alexis, Dessalines had to fi nd a counter-Prometheanism.
After independence, the Haitian people did not rework their defense strategy. Th ey did not say to themselves that they would have to continue achieving the victories gained on the battlefi eld in other fi elds of engagement. Th ey did not, ultimately, understand that if the gods had answered their prayers at the Bois Caiman, then the lesson was for them to count on their own strengths. Th e Christians put it this way: Th e Lord helps those who help themselves.
Perhaps there is luck. But it only passed by once, in 1804, and it was to teach us to reach beyond luck.
What to say in conclusion? Th at in recent Haitian political discourse we have seen leaders make some astonishing "free associations" with the mythical symbols of Vodun and with history.
Paul Magloire identifi ed himself with the god "Kanson fè." François Duvalier worked hard to take on the appearance and speech of the god of the cemeteries "Papa Gedé," the "good boy who mounts the palace steps" (bel gason lè li monte opalè).¹¹ At the same time, Duvalier took control of the symbol of the Dessalinean guinea-fowl, the "vigilant bird." To oppose the Duvalierists, Jean-Bertrand Aristide prided himself on being the "Kòk Kalité," the gallinaceous cock-fi ghting champion, and fi nally he represented himself as Toussaint Louverture's double.
It is as if the "imagination is in power" in Haiti. What remains for Haiti is to convert its "refuge values" into principles for mobilization.
Translated by Martin Munro.
11. Th e French translation is "Papa Gede, beau gosse qui gravit les marches du Palais national."
